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U.S. Comparative Education Research on Yugoslav Education in the 1950s and 1960s

With the advantage of hindsight it is easy—as a recent historiographic analysis of Yugoslavia’s treatment at the hands of American and British scholars notes—to suggest that academic work on Tito’s Yugoslavia would have been better directed if outside scholars had focused slightly less on the regime’s initiatives to foster workers’ self-management and paid more attention to national self-determination movements and inter-ethnic relations.1 The bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s starkly showed the inadequacy of much of the research literature of earlier decades and the assumption that the country would continue to exist. One can argue that American and other Western academics missed the boat on Yugoslavia even while rejecting the “ancient hatreds”/Balkan Ghosts argument and questioning the “freeze” thesis that Tito’s heavy hand kept everyone in line. Social science and historical scholarship poses its questions and chooses its topics within certain horizons or paradigms, and an examination of American re-

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search on Yugoslav education in the 1950s and 1960s shows U.S. comparative education research to have been no less shaped by cold war concerns and modernization theories than other academic disciplines.

The purpose of this article is not to specify what research questions should have been asked in the first two decades after World War II; it is to examine the questions that were asked (analysis of which can be assisted by examining those that weren’t asked). I aim to flesh out the features of a cold war comparative education research problematic as seen in the scholarly lens brought to bear on education in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Despite the opening comment that national self-determination was perhaps not adequately studied, it should be noted that Yugoslavia’s “nationalities question” was a feature in the comparative education literature of the 1950s and 1960s (as it was in other disciplines). However, as we will see, assumptions about educational institutions, theories about the form and function of schooling, and suppositions about development powerfully shaped how this was perceived as a “question.”

Of necessity, this is an analysis that generalizes and attempts to construct a coherent picture across studies that simultaneously indicate contestation and controversy over the proper directions and purposes of U.S. comparative education research at the time. To suggest, as 1 do below, that a certain idealism and sympathy for Yugoslavia’s “nonaligned” and “democratic” experiments is evident in the material is not meant to imply that all American scholars active in these two decades were of such political and ideological inclinations. All the same, interest in Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin, in Yugoslavia’s intermediary status between Western and Eastern bloc countries, and in the country’s proclaimed experiments with federalism and socialism was clearly critical to the American scholars who were drawn to Yugoslavia and were drawn to apply their comparative knowledge and methods to its educational problems.

Multiple strategies were employed in the present research to identify studies on Yugoslavia in the U.S. education research literature (principally articles, monographs, and books) of the first two decades after World War II. Articles dealing with Yugoslavia
were identified by annual indexes (and examining tables of contents issue by issue where there were no annual indexes) in journals such as Elementary School Journal, Social Studies, and The Educational Forum. The recent J-STOR digitalization of the Comparative Education Review (CER) enabled searches for articles in which Yugoslavia appears, not just in a title or abstract, but as a passing reference or minor point of comparison (e.g., in Seymour Martin Lipset's 1966 CER article on higher education discussed below). The decision to look only at U.S.-based publications is admittedly somewhat crude given that the field of comparative education is an international endeavor in the 1950s and 1960s, as it more or less has been across its history. Not examining the journals Comparative Education (published in the United Kingdom since 1964) or the International Review of Education arbitrarily excludes some U.S.-based scholarship, as does the exclusion of UNESCO-related work. However, as an initial foray into an unstudied topic, this strategy has yielded enough texts to reliably clarify certain patterns and themes. John Georff (at Purdue University) and Joseph S. Roucek (associated with various academic institutions) clearly emerge as the principal U.S.-based comparatists doing work on Yugoslavia. While biographical profiles are not included in the study presented here, it is acknowledged that such a strategy could be extremely useful for future work on the history of comparative education in these fields of study. This present article also only makes minor reference to the rich scholarship that follows in Edward Said's footsteps and looks at Western inscriptions of the Balkans as Other. A fuller examination of the historical termingling of comparative education research with orientalizing power/knowledge discourses holds great promise as a rewarding line of inquiry. Though this study is narrow in scope and restricted to an effort to unfold and understand the systems of reasoning inscribed in two decades of U.S. comparative education research on Yugoslavia, it aims to contribute to the broader literature that analyzes, in historical perspective, the systems of governance that travel through educational research and divide and order the actions and objects of schooling.

Modernizing Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia afforded many American scholars of comparative education a conceptual space and empirical location in which political modernity and social development could be examined for lessons that might have global significance. Across the board, American social science of the postwar period was rife with predictive and historical models that saw economic and political change as tied to culture and social structure, and in this respect the treatment of Yugoslavia was not unusual. However, Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 and the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform suggested a 'third way' of its time and meant that scholarly attention to Yugoslavia was highly attuned to the positioning of the country's political and social experiments as exceptional within an increasingly bipolar world. In his wide-ranging 1961 comparative education masterwork, The Education of Nations, Robert Ulich discussed Yugoslavia and India as "powers of a new form of neutrality" that through "skilful coalitions may determine the future of humanity more decisively than their strength of arms indicates." In justifying his extensive scholarship on Yugoslavia, John Georff proposed in 1965 that Yugoslavia was "assuming an increasingly important position among the nations of Europe and of the world." Of course, because of the nature of the enterprise, all academic studies must make a bid for their relevance and significance—for research on Yugoslavia, a common warrant was that it might represent the future of the globe.

Alongside Yugoslavia's fascination as a nonaligned nation were the experiments with workers' self-management that seemed to many to speak to a unique social and political experiment. In 1950, the Yugoslav National Assembly passed a bill on "workers' self-management" in state-run enterprises. Expanded later on, this became the foundation for claims that the Yugoslavs had developed a market socialism and it translated (particularly after 1953, though this tendency was noted earlier) into a broader commitment to centralization and increased autonomy for both the federation's six republics and the educational authorities in districts and towns. In theory, "the federal authorities limit themselves to passing basic
legislation." Joseph Roucek noted in 1957. However, he added that, "while it may be too early to pass judgment on the new system," he had observed complaints about all the deliberation that was expected of these self-managing bodies and had also witnessed the tendency ultimately to wait for directives from the capital city, Belgrade. In an indication of how this decentralization was viewed from the United States. Roucek noted that those in charge in Belgrade had decided to turn away from Stalinist methods and adopt ideas "which they learned in their contacts with Western democracies.", Yet the tendency was to treat these projects as pragmatic moves and see them in terms of a rationality of efficiency. In decentralizing his state, one account put it, Tito "has brought not only internal unity but greater efficiency to centralized government." The attribution of communist Yugoslavia's educational decentralization to "better" Western uteliae—and the lack of critical engagement with the significance that decentralization had for Yugoslav identity in relation to a Soviet Other—\textsuperscript{14} is revealing of how the analytic lenses of modernization theory were focused on Yugoslavia.

In the period under study here, interest in macro-sociological change became an increasing preoccupation across multiple academic disciplines. "Modernization" was the key problematic of American social science in the immediate postwar decades, even if the term itself was little used in the early 1950s and the expression "modernization theory" was not widespread until the 1960s.\textsuperscript{15} In this period scholars such as Daniel Lerner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Walt Rostow, and Edward Shils sought to explain the (apparently) growing prevalence of Western economic and political forms across the globe. Despite differences among the many academics working in this tradition, the general claim can be heard that modernization theorists consistently assumed that social change toward modernity was endogenously driven and followed a uniform, linear path. The influence that such academic scholarship had on U.S. domestic and foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s is well documented.\textsuperscript{14} One significant consequence of this for treatments of Yugoslavia was modernization theory's assumption that "traditional" ethnic, religious, and the "more virulent" national identities would automatically disappear as greater industrialization, literacy, and urbanization were achieved. Another consequence for scholarship on Yugoslavia was the tendency we have just examined of seeing the political/administrative organization of the country in terms of a pragmatic, efficiency-minded rationality that eclipsed ideological and identity politics. We can
get a sense of what might be at stake here by following Jovanović's intricate argument to its conclusion. The Soviet Other was of such significance to communist Yugoslavia that its disappearance after 1989, he maintains, led to a profound identity crisis and Yugoslavia's eventual disintegration. Whether or not we accept this as sufficient explanation for the Balkan wars of the 1990s, it does help to clarify how assumptions about modernization on the part of U.S. scholars skewed their analyses of the workings of communist Yugoslavia and its educational decentralization.

Decentralization was one plank of Yugoslavia's perceived educational system that was thought to be unique to the country. With the reestablishment of Yugoslavia and the reappearance of compulsory education there is good reason to believe that the time will soon come when Yugoslavia may boast of a well-educated population with a fruitful culture of its own," Severin Turicjenski wrote in optimistic tones prior to the close of World War II. The notion that interwar Yugoslavia failed to create a working, national system of schooling was a key piece of early communist party rhetoric about what would be different in postwar Yugoslavia, and the same argument appears in the historiography on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The "underdeveloped" state of the educational system prior to World War II also served as frequent backdrop to U.S. comparative education scholarship on Yugoslavia. Tomich painted the picture in dire terms:

The number of schools was small; a large proportion of the population remained illiterate; vocational training was inadequate; many branches of the economy—particularly in industry—had no schools. Opportunities were not provided for pupils from certain types of lower schools to continue their studies in secondary schools or for those attending certain secondary schools to continue in schools of higher learning. Lack of schools, the high rates of illiteracy that Tomich goes on to cite, and the unenforceability (across the 1930s, and certainly during the war) of the 1929 school law which mandated eight years of compulsory schooling are well documented. In the postwar era, Yugoslavs were apparently no less optimistic than the researchers who studied them that improved schooling was the key to country's future. In the summary of what is otherwise generally a dryly descriptive study, Tomich records that "education in Yugoslavia signifies much more than the mere acquisition of knowledge. It has become a national symbol to a people who, for many centuries, were subjected to foreign domination and were prevented from acquiring a high degree of literacy."

though this is most likely an accurate picture, it is important to note that identical rhetoric circulated in the 1920s. By certain standards, interwar Yugoslav education had not been successful; however, more to the point here is the significance the "truth" of this took on for the country's new communist leadership. The ability to castigate the "first" Yugoslavia as backward meant, according to Jovanović that communist Yugoslavia could position the old, "bourgeois" Yugoslavia as a second antipodal Other against which it could define itself. U.S. comparative education scholarship adopted this mise en scène for its own studies of Yugoslav education in the 1950s and 1960s, again substituting a modernization-related faith in the educational institutions for a more nuanced, cultural, and ideological analysis of the situation. It would surely be overstretching to extend this reasoning about the national and state-building power of schooling and attribute the eventual failure of the second Yugoslavia to failures and inadequacies in its educational systems, yet it can be said with certainty that both in practice and in theory things did not work out as the modernization-minded social science models of the immediate postwar decades had predicted.

The problem of youth indoctrination

"The aim of communist education is to train students in a very narrow field and to deprive them of all around knowledge and an inquiring mind," wrote Stavro Skendi in reference to Yugoslavia in 1957. It is not to be disputed that communist schooling in the twentieth century did attempt to advance an ideologically coherent schooling experience. To would accord with Marxist-Leninist principles and produce the kinds of people who were to inhabit the socialist utopias being invoked and envisioned. At the same time, one cannot fail to note that the U.S. depiction of communist
schooling as narrow and restrictive had inherent self-serving and self-aggrandizing features. The clear implication across many of these texts is that Western, democratic schooling was the polar opposite. An example of this can be found in Georgeoff's 1966 article on social studies in Yugoslavia, which noted that the pedagogical technique of classroom discussion was officially sanctioned and a widespread teaching method. Further clarification of what this entailed was required, however, for he noted that "discussion in Yugoslavia varies considerably from the United States." Georgeoff described the Yugoslav version of discussion in catechetical terms and with an appropriate metaphor: "In Yugoslav schools, discussion usually employs a type of Pavlovian stimulus-response approach; the teacher asks questions to which pupils give predetermined responses they have learned from class lectures or by reading the textbook. During the discussion period, pupils seldom ask their teacher questions about some point in the lesson; and almost never is there direct communication . . . between one pupil and another."¹⁵

As in Skendli's depiction, the image here is of a very narrowed form of learning devoid of independent inquiry. A sense of control dominates the teacher-student interactions described here; later, Georgeoff characterizes discussion in the Yugoslav school as a "mechanical routine" that is used even in the country's demonstration or experimental schools. All of this clarification for the benefit of a U.S. readership took it for granted that American schools were considerably different.

The political and cultural purposes that such early cold war educational comparisons served can be highlighted by looking at two strands of research that suggest that the juxtapositions of the American and Soviet educational systems as radically diametric were overdrawn in the 1950s and 1960s. First, the "revisionist challenge" in the historiography of American education—as advanced in the 1970s by scholars such as Michael B. Katz and Joel Spring¹⁶—has helped to establish scholarly acceptance of the idea that U.S. schools do not function as the universal purveyors of opportunity, well-rounded learning and independent inquiry they are purported to be. When U.S. schools are seen as indoctrinating working-class students to be disciplined and obedient, allegations of indoctrination in communist education seem less shocking and less exceptional. A second strand of scholarship suggesting that Soviet-U.S. educational differences were overstated can be found in research that focuses on how schooling is historically connected with nation-building and state-building. From this perspective, Soviet and American modernization projects can appear remarkably similar. Thomas Popkewitz has argued that despite the seemingly different political and ideological contexts in which Lev Vyotsky and John Dewey worked, both produced psychologies and constructivist learning theories that embodied an identical doctrine of modernity. Both based their work on an Enlightenment belief in the human potential for reason and a faith that the social sciences would provide guidance in shaping the capabilities, values, and dispositions of citizens as self-governing participants in the nation- and state-building project.²⁸ Whereas the revisionist challenge might suggest that the attachment of "indoctrination" to communist education was itself an ideological strategy for obscuring the actual (identical) workings of American education, Popkewitz's arguments about the political rationalities of modernity might suggest that to attach notions of primitiveness and backwardness to communist education was to engage in a tactical game over the definition of progress and over who and what should properly represent the modern. In connection with the latter, we can read Georgeoff's comment that "despite some recent criticism against this mechanical question-and-answer routine, much of the classwork even in demonstration schools continues along these traditional lines,"²⁶ as part of a broader bid to claim for oneself and deny for others the achievement of modernity.

A significant article for setting the framework of postwar American analyses of communist education was John S. Reshetar's 1950 article, "The Educational Weapon." Despite this foreboding title, Reshetar situated communist education within a sociological framework that considered schooling as a necessary part of promoting social cohesion around the prevailing values of any community, and, accordingly, proposed that "under any circumstances, education almost inevitably becomes a weapon." Reshetar described the sum
total of communist educational initiatives as a “program of mass indoctrination,” unc critical education within the communist party as mechanical and dehumanizing. Upon mention that in August 1947 the Hungarian Communist Party admitted 100,000 new members, Reshetar commented, “the vast majority of new members were neo-pupets who had to be trained in the intricacies of dialectical materialism or at least conditioned to mouth the appropriate clichés.” In the word “conditioned” we have an echo of Georgoff’s depiction of Yugoslav classroom discussions. We also have what was most likely an accurate picture of the ideological training within the party. Readers of Cvejic Milic’s The Captive Mind will be familiar with the truly dire straits of intellectual life under communist regimes. Yet, at the same time as these depredations are acknowledged, one cannot but help wondering if some among the 100,000 Hungarians who experienced conversion in August 1947 were not so much “conditioned” to produce the correct rhetoric as strategically maneuvering, in an agentic manner, on account of their independent inquiries and critical analyses of the situation. As we will see in the next section, the denial of human agency that accompanied this line of U.S. scholarship on educational indoctrination needed to be entirely rethought when the topic shifted to higher education.

It is also worth noting here that U.S. researchers did not only find indoctrination inside the classroom. The 1958 “General Law of Education in Yugoslavia” mandated that schools were to expand and enrich educational work through “various forms of free activities of pupils,” such as field trips, excursions, and extra-curricular clubs. In the face of this, however, John Georgoff’s 1965 Elementary School Journal article on Yugoslav schools carefully noted that “the term free activities is really a misnomer,” [original emphasis] for participation was mandatory and part of student’s regular schoolwork. A similar skepticism about the communist regime’s democratic rhetoric was expressed in Georgoff’s 1964 CER article on Yugoslav student organizations and the “supposedly” voluntary character of membership in the Yugoslav Pioneer movement. In fact, “the pressure to belong is so tremendous that few pupils can resist it”, Georgoff noted that he had not yet met a Yugoslav pupil who was not a member of the Pioneers. These activities attracted the attention of researchers such as Georgeoff for the socialization function that—on all sides—they were perceived to perform. Recent scholarship on the Yugoslav Pioneer movement has proposed that there was more going on here than a simple desire for ideological control. Idioko Erdei argues that the attention the state paid to children, as seen in the commitment to the Pioneer organization, was central to the socialist project of creating a new social order and the new, unburdened people who would inhabit it. Erdei argues that “socialist childhood” in Yugoslavia was backed by an ideology of “happy childhood,” which, while borrowed from Soviet iconography, was ultimately used to support the unique path that the Yugoslav socialist project attempted to chart. While this would suggest that it was understandable for social control and political socialization to be key concerns of comparative education research on Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, it also indicates that the general inability (on the part of U.S. scholars) to look beyond the problem of indoctrination foreclosed possibilities for more complex and penetrating political and cultural analyses.

The problem of youth delinquency and apathy

A strange bedfellow to research indicating strong political indoctrination in the early years of the Yugoslav educational system was the studies that talked about the dangers that too many overeducated university youth posed to Yugoslavia’s social and economic stability. In the late 1950s U.S. comparative education literature displayed a growing sensitivity to “the youth problem,” spurred partly by a growing awareness of the increasingly global character of youth culture. Rock ‘n roll and Elvis Presley were not solely American concerns; one could find root-suiters in the Soviet Union and blue jeans in high demand the world over. A 1958 New York Times Magazine special report on youth of the world is indicative of the anxiety and clear about the rationale for an international comparative examination of this problem:
Juvenile delinquency—and the question of what to do about it—is a matter of growing urgency in the United States. The New York Times asked correspondents in nine capitals abroad to report on young people’s behavior in their areas. Their findings show that teenage wildness is worldwide, but that in some countries, particularly those where family ties are strong, juvenile delinquency presents no serious problems.13

In the same year George Z.F. Beready published a piece on education and youth in the communist world that reviewed evidence suggesting both a steady improvement in the quality of schooling in Eastern Europe and a dramatic increase in adolescent disturbances in the same countries. Beready pinned the source of increased youth alcoholism, crime and delinquency on the disenchantment that followed from a mismatch between the expectations of youth (as formed by what had been promised by the communists) and the actual reality. In Beready’s argument, the problem did not lie in communist education systems themselves but in the (ultimately unworkable) attempts to generate loyalty through the provision of educational opportunity where actual ideological enthusiasm was not forthcoming.14

In contrast, Joseph Roucek’s scholarship on youth and higher education in Yugoslavia emphasized educational shortcomings over ideological mismanagement. Nonetheless, for both scholars, youth dissatisfaction and the mismatch between schooling and employment prospects were problematized in terms of the modernization concern of how best to develop and harness an elite that would propel development forward. Interestingly, Roucek apportioned some of the blame to the higher education graduates and students themselves. He argued that Yugoslavs “took the attitude that only peasants and fools work in the provinces and that smart young people who receive university education should not be made to suffer the hardships of rural life.” Adequate numbers of jobs in major cities were not forthcoming, however, and these “slackers” had a knack for “outmaneuver[ing] the authorities by becoming perpetual students.” They “roam the streets” and “infest the cafés of all the major cities.” Roucek’s language attributes a considerable degree of agency to these students and pathologizes them at the same time. The overzealous, rapid expansion of the higher education system was one factor in the creation of this pool of dangerous youth. In less than a decade Tito’s regime had more than tripled the number of university faculties, raising some concerns about unevenness between programs and the inadequate preparation of faculty. Yet, fully in keeping with the assumptions of modernization theory, the major obstacle Roucek identified was a “traditional Balkan ideology” which held that a university graduate was entitled to a state appointment.15 The question of how intellectual elites were to be optimally worked into the modernization of underdeveloped countries was taken up in Seymour Martin Lipset’s 1966 article in the Comparative Education Review on university students and politics. Both American social scientists and communist regimes across the globe were confronting the conundrum that a young generation brought up under communist rule was emerging as not fully supportive of the regimes that had favored and placed their hopes in these youth. Lipset cited 1961 survey data from Warsaw and from Zagreb to argue that these students did not support the status quo. In his formulation, what made for “modern intellectuals” was that they became agents of social change and economic growth, and according to this 1966 article, more social science modeling was needed to determine the conditions under which political activity by university students in underdeveloped countries would help or hinder this process.16 What is striking about the problems that Yugoslav youth were posing to U.S. comparative education researchers is that the indoctrination concerns that dominated other areas of scholarship were nearly entirely done away with when attention turned to the modernization of the country’s higher education system.

Conclusion: The nationalities question

Yugoslavia’s recent moves toward further decentralization is for the purpose of destroying old concepts left by the Turks, the Hapsburgs, and the Nazi occupation. The hope is that this decentralization will lead to greater unity, as it has in the United States.17

This statement from a 1969 U.S. Department of Education-
funded study of education research in Eastern Europe perfectly captures the paradigmatic modernization theory view of ethnic and religious tensions. As mentioned, the assumption was that these would simply fall away in the face of more “modern” nationalities, more efficient administrative systems, and greater industrial and economic development. The U.S. melting pot mythology of ethnic differences steadily yielding to a cohesive national identity also helped to shape U.S. comparative education scholars’ approach to Yugoslavia’s “nationalities question.” Underlying all the answers to this question was the idea of time. In nearly all the accounts, Yugoslavia’s federal and decentralized structure was posed in contrast to the interwar Yugoslavias. Similar to what we saw above with regard to the general expansion of education, when it came to ethnicity and national unity, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could usefully serve as a “backward” past needing to be transcended. “The old Yugoslavia,” Georgoff’s account went, was “like a powder keg, ready to blow itself up at any moment.” In order to “avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the old regime in this respect” Tito had adopted a more liberal language policy for schooling that, Georgoff quoted an American diplomat as saying, was one of “the cleverest moves the Yugoslav communists ever made.” Decentralization, language policy, the federal structure—all were upheld as evidence promising that Yugoslavia would be a successful and durable modern nation state.

A 1957 piece by Tito himself, attributing interethnic peace to his personal ability, “Somehow or another, to weld these differences together and make the system work,”41 In a 1964 prognosis, however, Roucek spoke about change in Yugoslavia in more systemic terms:

Whatever difficulties there are—and there are many—the official policy has been to ignore such divergences, with the hope that a regime of tolerance and growing economic integration will eventually eliminate them. The fact remains that the New Yugoslavia is much more firmly established than the First Yugoslavia.42

In the attention paid to ethnic and religious tensions within Yugoslavia, U.S. comparative education scholars were addressing a key concern of the communist regime in the 1950s and 1960s, and, interestingly enough, both were reliant on similar reasoning about what modernization promised to bring to state-building.43 Notwithstanding the intriguing possibility that socialist Yugoslavia did not last quite long enough, the violent conflagrations of the 1990s neither confirm nor refute the assumptions and research of U.S. comparative education scholars three decades earlier. However, neither does the fact that the demise of Yugoslavia was not seen coming confirm the argument that “ancient hatreds” bubbled below the surface unchanged for the duration of socialist period. The death knell for modernization theory came in the late 1960s—early 1970s as more and more scholars questioned its premises of converging, linear social and political evolution, and as conflict-ridden relations of imperialism and “dependency” increasingly came to seen as more accurately descriptive of the world scene. More and more scholars also argued that “tradition” was not the opposite of modernity. Rather, it would be around for a while since it was an active social production of the here-and-now, produced through its relation to modernity.44 The analytic frames applied to Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s did not set scholars on the right path for grasping the contested productions of “tradition” seen during Yugoslavia’s socialist period—productions that would play an ominous role in the events of the 1990s. The modernization problematic had most comparative education research focusing on state administrative and policy actions, with less concern for what might be happening in the ideological and cultural milieu. When, in the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. attention was in fact directed to the ideological content of Yugoslav schooling practices, cold war concerns meant that only a partial picture was captured. Excessively sharp contrasts were drawn between Yugoslav and Western, democratic schooling, even as education in both contexts could be seen to be anchored in a deep, progressive faith in the potential that schooling held for social, economic, and cultural enlightenment.

Notes


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Rethinking Little Rock

The Cold War Politics of School Integration in the United States

On the night of 4 September 1957, Daisy Bates, president of the Arkansas chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), called the students who would be integrating Central High School the next day and organized a plan for them to meet at her home first so that they could attend together. One of the students, Elizabeth Eckford, was never contacted because her family didn’t own a telephone. She arrived at Central the next morning alone, met by a large crowd of some four hundred students and parents, who began shouting: “A nigger! They’re coming! Here they come!” Eckford saw a line of soldiers in front of the entrance and, wrongly, assumed they were there to help her. When she approached one soldier waved her away. She tried to move past another but he lifted his bayonet-tipped M-1 rifle and the other soldiers moved

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