American Philanthropy and Reconstruction in Europe after World War I: Bringing the West to Serbia

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Three American armies invaded Europe in the years of World War I and in its aftermath—at least such was the account proposed in 1924 by the Serbian Child Welfare Association of America. First came the American Expeditionary Force, which entered the war in 1917 after the European combatants had been fighting for three years. The second “American army” was the American Relief Force that arrived after the armistice of November 11, 1918; the third was the “Army of Reconstruction.” And, according to the Serbian Child Welfare Association, “the first army helped to set Europe free; the second lifted her and set her on her feet; the third army started her on her way rejoicing toward a higher civilization.” As will become clear in this chapter, the activities of these three “armies” were not as clear-cut and distinct as portrayed here, nor were they necessarily separated and neatly sequenced, however it is not to be contested that during and after World War I a substantial number of Americans invaded Europe with notions of freedom, uplift, and civilization on their minds.

A striking feature of this U.S. reconstruction and relief work in Europe was its voluntary and philanthropic character. While the “doughboys” in General Pershing’s Expeditionary Force were conscripted, they were supported by tens of thousands of individual American volunteers: ambulance drivers sent by dozens of American
was very much the earlier, applied social work model that dominated American reconstruction projects in war-torn Europe. Thus, while post-WW I American philanthropic involvement overseas did not exactly anticipate the modernization problematic of later decades, it still operated as a norm-setting, knowledge-producing enterprise. Moreover, what we see at this moment in terms of the stance Americans took toward international work was quite consistent with approaches to international reconstruction work taken earlier and later. Salient here, as I will argue, is the ease with which Americans could see themselves as justly and unproblematically intervening in public spheres outside the United States.

Rockefeller was foremost among American foundations in supporting aid and reconstruction activities in Europe during and after World War I. In October 1914 a Rockefeller War Relief Committee was founded and undertook a European study tour that resulted in funding for Hoover’s Commission for Relief in Belgium, considerable funds dedicated to expanding the work of the American Red Cross, and the launching of the aforementioned 1915 medical mission to Serbia under the direction of Harvard Medical School professor Dr. Richard P. Strong. Foundation philanthropy played a notable role in American reconstruction projects in Europe: through foundation-managed initiatives as well as grants to existing organizations (e.g., the YMCA, YWCA, and the American Red Cross) and to ad hoc relief organizations (e.g., the Commission for Relief in Belgium, the Serbian Child Welfare Association, among hundreds of others). However, a much larger portion of the American relief work appears to have been funded by individual contributions.

The aid that Americans could offer their European counterparts in the late 1910s and early 1920s also provided an opportunity for the export of the American model of philanthropy in and of itself. Yet, as Merle Curti has pointed out, while philanthropy has been both index and agent of a distinctively “American character,” U.S. traditions of charitable giving were initially drawn from Europe and have long borne the imprint of Elizabethan poor laws and emphasis on providing for the “deserving poor.” Recent scholarship on Europe-U.S. “Atlantic crossings” has revealed continuing patterns of mutual interaction, all of which serves as a useful reminder that charitable good works were also a venerable European tradition. However, when, for example, Americans such as Rushton Fairclough, the Red Cross Commissioner to Montenegro, expressed cynicism about Europeans, he drew on a normative vision that linked charity to private initiative and civic volunteerism. This vision—as will be seen below—was understood at the time as the “American” way of doing things. Fairclough, an erstwhile professor of classics at Stanford, in fact laid his critique on Romanians that he observed in 1919 at a horse race in Bucharest, writing,

these rich people would spend their money freely in amusements, but they would not lift a finger to relieve the poverty of their fellow countrymen. Perhaps, I thought, they are laughing in their sleeves at the generous Americans who have come over here, with their practical philanthropy. How good, I thought, it would be to get back to Montenegro, where everyone is poor, everybody is in rags, and where we know that American money is well spent.

Anxiety not to appear as Lady Bountiful but to develop practical philanthropy that would meet immediate needs as well as allow the planning of a better future pervades the American reconstruction literature. Across the different American reconstruction projects examined in this chapter, one regularly finds the precept that American aid should enable Europeans to become more active in the service of their communities. In one form or another, reconstruction projects helped to transmit a particular vision of the role that charitable works and civic initiative ought to play in civil society. And, as we see in other chapters of this volume, American models spread partly because they were ostensibly offered out of charitable concern and in a manner that professed to be noncoercive (not just in Europe, but globally).

Some of the ways that American reconstruction projects defined problems and solutions and normalized behaviors and subjectivities are nicely illustrated in a letter from an anonymous Frenchwoman published in 1919 in the U.S. social work journal The Survey. With armed conflict over, American charities were pressed to make the case that assistance continued to be needed in Europe and thus regularly briefed the American public on the extent of the devastation. In arguing for the continuing need for American aid, the author felt the need to address the possible perception that the French might be unworthy of further assistance. She acknowledged that French initiative and engagement in their own reconstruction did seem lacking, but noted that “Americans are more active in their social work... because they give less importance to family than the French.” The writer accepted the French commitment to family
as a fault but explained it as a fact based on obligations to family and children and an education "that makes every one dependent on something or other," adding.

since the war, many French women and many girls have imitated the Americans and gone out of their families, because it was necessary. All my young friends who are not married work in crèches, dispensaries, canteens, etc.; and all my young friends who are married and mothers do something, some social work, although their situation does not make it always very easy.19

While this letter—chosen, of course, by Americans to help make their case—is not without ambiguity, it does demonstrate the potential disruptions and "intrusions" that American reconstruction projects could introduce in Europe. Here, we see differing gender norms cast to some extent in terms of a traditional/modern conflict. In the remainder of this chapter I will examine the various ways that American influence and models were projected in post-conflict reconstruction projects. Social welfare, child welfare, and education quickly emerge as key domains of activity. The chapter proceeds by examining how a civilizing mandate was constructed, then turns to look specifically at the case of norm-making around child welfare and education reform in Serbia.

Market Empire and the Civilizing Mandate

Herbert Hoover was elected U.S. president in 1928 after serving as Secretary of Commerce in both the Harding and Coolidge administrations. He entered office with a record of considerable humanitarian accomplishments, and enjoyed a hero’s reputation both in the United States and overseas for his role in coordinating emergency American aid to Europe’s distressed civilian population during and after the Great War. A Quaker and former mining engineer who had worked in the American West, Australia, and China, Hoover found himself caught up with the consequences that war had on civilian populations and established the Committee for Relief in Belgium 1914. Throughout the war this remarkable organization conducted its own diplomacy, chartered ships under its own flag, and succeeded in feeding much of occupied Belgium. At the end of the war in 1918 Hoover was named head of the American Relief Administration (ARA) and oversaw health and food initiatives in war-torn Europe. His humanitarian experience was again called upon after WWII when he was asked to establish a U.S. government feeding program in occupied Germany. Hoover’s government service was internationally oriented in other dimensions as well: as secretary of commerce he was responsible for doubling the number of commerce offices overseas and for emphasizing U.S. government assistance in the promotion of American exports.20 Hoover’s dual persona as international humanitarian and international businessman stands as emblematic of the overlap between what Victoria de Grazia has usefully termed America’s “market empire” and the international humanitarian work that, I am arguing, was undertaken by Americans, at least in the early decades of the twentieth century, as their mission civilisatrice.

Classic liberal free trade principles have long provided the warrant for “opening” up foreign markets. Instead of viewing the public sphere as an area that is legitimately controlled and managed by indigenous authorities, Americans have a storied tradition of emphasizing that mercantile commerce can legitimately trump such factors.21 While the commercial advantages that accrue from such a stance are not to be denied, it also rests on a current of thought (from Hugo Grotius through the Enlightenment) that proposes “exchange” as the most desirable principle to govern international order.22 And, I would argue, this stance additionally relates to the cultural rules of modern adulthood, that is, the particular, contemporary meanings of human agency and what counts as “agentive” action. Neo-institutionalist sociologists John Meyer and Ronald Jepperson argue that over the last several centuries we have seen the steady relocation of agentic capability away from transcendental or natural authorities into human beings. Rather than looking outside society (to divine design or “forces” of nature) to explain how and why things happen in society, explanations are more and more frequently found within society, within human action. Significantly, Meyer and Jepperson argue that participants in modern society “enact in their identities substantial agency for broad cultural purposes.”23 The uniqueness, in historical terms, of this now increasingly globalized notion of modern adulthood lies in the capability, legitimacy and, at times, even obligation to act in the interests of others.24 These are the features of “agentive adulthood” that are put into play in many a humanitarian initiative. They also form the cultural rules that allowed American reconstruction workers to act in the interest of Europeans whose options and ability to act had been severely limited by the devastations of the war. While Meyer and Jepperson’s work speaks to a generalized modern “cultural system” in fact originating in
Europe, the frequency with which “initiative,” “activity,” “pioneering spirit,” and “social work” were attached to Americans in the aftermath of World War I suggests that this was a time when Americans could present themselves as modern actors par excellence. Whether operating in the guise of businessman or humanitarian, Americans generally took entry into the public sphere as natural right and entitlement.

Sanitation and hygiene make frequent appearance as an arena in which American activity and intervention could uplift Europe. Christopher Endy has discussed the preoccupation with hygiene that appears in the writings of U.S. travelers to Europe around the turn of the twentieth century. He notes that while European backwardness in this regard is bemoaned, the literature also makes mention of the salutary influence that American travelers and their habits have had, particularly in places like France and Italy. Similar accounts can be found in the writings of Americans working on reconstruction projects after World War I. For example, Rushton Fairclough’s memoirs describe a project undertaken by one of the members of the American Red Cross Commission to Montenegro where a young American discovered an abandoned Turkish bathhouse, cleaned it out, outfitted it with hot water, and put it back into operation. When the Red Cross Commission was withdrawn in 1921 they turned the operation over to the city of Podgorica, and the whole enterprise was described by Fairclough as “an interesting illustration of American ingenuity and initiative, as well of American cleanliness and comfort.” The ways that American sanitation could bring civilization to an “old” Europe were also demonstrated in a report from another Red Cross Commissioner, Ernest P. Bicknell, who wrote of the new Czechoslovak president Tomáš Masaryk discovering that the Austro-Hungarian Hradčany castle in Prague that was now to be his residence did not include a bathroom among its 1,100 rooms. As Bicknell related the story, Masaryk only agreed to live in the castle once an “American bathroom” had been installed.

While there is ample evidence that American firms profited handsomely from the war and reconstruction projects subsequent to it, my argument is not that American post-conflict aid served as cover for the ulterior motive of expanding overseas markets. The democracy of consumption that underpinned America’s Market Empire across the twentieth century (an “imperium with the outlook of an emporium” as de Grazia cleverly puts it) consisted of a set of ideas and practices surrounding what was natural, modern, and best-practice. These were the microphysics of “soft power” that adhered both in commercial and humanitarian activities, and by whose token Masaryk made the right stand. Though they do not issue forth in coordinated fashion from a stable center, the sum of these “rules” and regulative principles have coalesced to afford a position of influence and global preeminence for the United States for much of the twentieth century. Whether in the invention of the calorie, the teaching of new farming techniques, or the dissemination of a health textbook, embedded normative principles rendered people legible and governable according to modern forms of governmentality.

Child Welfare, Vocational Education, and Norm-Making in Serbia

Early in the war, aid to Serbia emerged as cause célèbre in the United States. The Serbian war experience had all the makings of high drama: extraordinary heroism and tenacity; a thrice-occupied capital; a victimized peasant population; and, displaced refugees dispersed across Europe and North Africa. In late 1915, having been defeated by the combined forces of the Bulgarian, German, and Austro-Hungarian armies, the Serbian army, together with considerable numbers of civilians, retreated through mountainous Montenegro and Albania. Around 60,000 perished along this route; the 150,000 Serbs that managed to reach the Mediterranean shore were met and relocated by allied transport ships. Americans were heavily involved in aiding Serbian refugees in diaspora, however, in these early stages, American humanitarian involvement in the country itself centered around the American hospital in Belgrade (under the management of Dr. Edward W. Ryan, who was featured in the New York Times as “the American Doctor who Saved Belgrade”) and Dr. Richard P. Strong’s American Red Cross/Rockefeller Foundation typhus expedition. Reporting on the latter at the Red Cross annual meeting in January 1916, Strong opined that the most important lesson was that the Serbian epidemic would not have occurred “if the Serbs had been properly prepared.” Leaving Serbia properly prepared and properly organized in fact became the key objective of the bulk of the post-conflict reconstruction work.

Serbs played an active role in directing American attention to the plight of Serbia. Notable fundraisers included Helen Lozanić who was appointed the Serbian Red Cross delegate to the United States in 1914 and spoke at hundreds of fundraising events across the country over the next five years, raising money for organizations including the Serbian Distress Fund of Boston and the Serbian Relief Fund of
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Conquering one more stubborn corner of the earth to make it serve man and bear food for his support and enjoyment.  

Americans are positioned in this text as the emissaries of “work,” agentic capacity and modernity. Imparting these values, dispositions, and ways of being to Serbs was a consistent theme across American reconstruction projects in the country.  

As the agricultural mission Monastir evidences, American projects tended to first focus on emergency needs and then aim for long-term impact. This aid trajectory was evident in other theaters of operation, especially on Red Cross projects. In Poland, by 1920/21, the Red Cross program had shifted from general relief to child health and educational work. And, even though the original instructions given to the 1919–21 Red Cross Commission to Montenegro were that their work was to be purely emergency aid and “not to be prompted by any program of a permanent nature,” leaving a long-term legacy became a pressing concern by the end, with the American Junior Red Cross stepping in to continue school and orphanage projects after the commission withdrew.  

In Serbia, relief work moved from emergency feeding and triaging the needs of displaced people into child health programs and vocational education projects.  

The Serbian Child Welfare Association (SCWA) was the principal American organization active in post–conflict reconstruction work in Serbia. While the American Red Cross sent several commissions to Serbia during and after the war, as noted above, the bulk of its postwar work was farmed out to the SCWA, which itself was an outgrowth of the Serbian Relief Fund. Ralph R. Reeder, who had volunteered for the American Red Cross in France and who served superintendent of the New York Orphan Asylum Society, headed the SCWA mission from 1920 to 1922, the period of its principal activity. In Serbia it was often simply referred to as the Američka misija or American Commission. In the United States, support for SCWA work grew out of a study tour that Homer Folks, head of Red Cross Relief work in France during the war, took to Italy and the Balkans in late 1918. Folks’ report appeared as a book titled The Human Costs of the War. Just as Serbia had attracted American attention in the early stages of the war, it did so again after the armistice on account of the desperate circumstances its people faced. However, now this was framed in terms of a nation newly formed and newly embarked on a modernization quest.  

The war had extreme consequences for public health. Considerable numbers of Serbian doctors had not survived, and in setting up health

New York (later to become the Serbian Child Welfare Association). Fundraising posters and accounts such as Lozanić’s indicate that a discourse of victimization combined with portrayal of Serbians as peasant peoples framed these appeals for aid. Lozanić, the daughter of one of the University of Belgrade’s first rector and Serb representative at a 1911 international women’s conference in Copenhagen, regularly donned colorfully embroidered peasant garb at fundraising events—as did the wife of Serbian ambassador Slavko M. Grujić, also an active fundraiser on behalf of Serbia. In this second case, the attire is even more remarkable given that Mabel Grujić was an American (née Mabel Dunlop) originally from West Virginia. By the late 1910s Serbia had made some strides toward reflexive modernization, however the economy remained overwhelmingly agriculture and the Serbian need for American assistance was cloaked in imagery of peasant purity and primitiveness. In the light of American modernity, Serbia (like other “new” or “young” countries in East/Central Europe) appeared as an “old Europe” whose simplicity and undeveloped state made it particularly suited for American uplift and rescue.  

That American aid to Serbia was framed as a civilizing mission is starkly evident in a 1919 account of the Red Cross agricultural unit that worked in Monastir (present-day Bitola, Macedonia). The piece that appeared in the Red Cross Magazine was titled “Taking the West into Monastir”—on the one hand an oblique reference to “Western civilization,” but more explicitly it was a reference to the involvement of Americans from the upper Midwest. In this instance the delegation was headed by a Croatian immigrant and Catholic priest, Francis Jager, who was also involved in agricultural education at the University of Minnesota. Their vehicles were reported as the “first friendly advance agents of modernity to travel through the streets of many of these huddled villages”; the article included photographs of destitute Serbian refugees returning home in exposed train boxcars as well as a woman and child in native dress. The American mission offered meals, dug wells, offered “technical schooling” and imported farm equipment (tractors, combines, and sawmills) that was eventually turned over to the Serbian government. The article offered the appraisal that thanks to this initiative, “the peasants know something of American machines now; they have American seed and have seen Americans work.” Echoing the mythology of the conquest of the frontier in the American West, the piece also spoke to the introduction of...
centers in 1920–21, the SCWA was attempting to remedy the near absence of medical services in some areas. At the same time, the postwar reconstruction period afforded the opportunity for general public health, sanitation, and hygiene campaigns that the SCWA undertook at its centers but also on a broader scale by underwriting an elementary school health textbook and organizing Child Health Exhibits.

Across Europe, the American reconstruction projects that targeted child health and child welfare were overtly interested in changing habits and behaviors. In their bids to set new norms, Americans frequently organized didactic exhibits in the spirit of the World’s Fairs and international expositions that had served as spectacles of modernity and progress since the mid-nineteenth century. A fine example of this was the April 1918 American Red Cross Child Welfare Exhibit in Lyons, France. Modeled on the Philadelphia Baby Show of 1911, the Lyons exposition included educational films, a demonstration kindergarten with actual students, as well as booths dedicated to the preparation of milk, dental hygiene, and baby care. The Lyons exhibit recorded 72,000 visitors in its first nine days of operation, and, because of this success, was turned into a traveling exposition that later toured Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris. In Serbia, the SCWA organized baby fairs in numerous cities—events that included lessons, demonstrations, and prizes given to the best cared for babies. Extravagant, expansive claims were sometimes attached to health-related work: a small Quaker mission in Peć, Montenegro (present day Kosovo) optimistically proposed that their hospital and regular home visits to develop “the habit of proper sanitation and better living” could lead to interethnic peace. “There could be no stronger tool in the work of replacing international hatred and suspicion by trust and understanding,” than when such educational work was coupled with programs that brought Serbs, Turks, Albanians, and Montenegrans together and trained them to be nurses, the Quakers claimed. The SCWA work in this area indexed more predictable arguments about instructing the “Serbian people in the right methods of infant and child welfare” in order to save babies and lower the infant mortality rate.

The SCWA’s April 1922 Child Health Exhibit in Belgrade was attended by over 30,000 people and included the participation of local organizations. This strategy reflected the SCWA’s commitment to partnership projects, an orientation toward reconstruction work summed up in their position that “whatever you induce a people to do for themselves is of infinitely more value than what you do for them.”

In most cases the Serbian peasant communities went far beyond it, for when once aroused and started on the school building job they carried it much further than the Association’s initial fifty-fifty proposition required them to go. The blight of war had stupefied the people and paralyzed public spirit. All that was needed to stir latent energies was an initial push from their American friends.

As noted above, American reconstruction projects were clearly—overtly and consciously, as we see here—in the business of exporting a set of ideal behaviors and dispositions related to agency and acthood. Local partnerships also undergirded the SCWA’s work to advance vocational education in Serbia. Here, the chief mechanism was a local advisory board, the “Committee on Institutions and Vocational Education,” minutes from whose meetings show that it did not merely rubber-stamp but was quite active in shaping SCWA activities. As is shown by the involvement of Serbs, not to mention the industrial schools that had been in operation before the war, it is far from the case that Americans single-handedly introduced vocational education to Serbia. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Americans advanced and advocated such forms of schooling in their reconstruction work.
Part of the explanation for this lies in a belief in the social and individual benefits of work—something that we find in numerous American aid initiatives in Europe. Early in the war, the Red Cross undertook some experiments in providing employment opportunities for female Belgian refugees in Holland. When provided with sewing machines and instructed in the manufacture of undergarments, a “transformation” occurred: “the opportunity to provide their families and others with warm underwear” revolutionized the discipline problems that had previously plagued the camps. Under the supervision of American pastor John Van Schaick, the experiment was carried into 35 refugee camps, where it was found that sewing and knitting classes had “counteracted the demoralizing influence of refugee life,” brought about friendships between Belgian and Dutch women, and, overall, had “both an educational and moral influence.”

In Switzerland, the American Red Cross set up a trade school for displaced Belgian boys who were known after their benefactor as “Rockefeller children.” The practical and moral benefit or replacing idle hands with industrious activity was abundantly apparent in refugee situations and continued to be a strategic objective in post–conflict reconstruction as well.

American sponsorship of vocational education in post–conflict Serbia also reflects the broader pattern of overseas American educational work strongly favoring manual training and vocational education. As Jason Yaremko argues in this volume, and historian Jonathan Zimmerman has also shown, the U.S. international emphasis on agricultural and industrial subjects over academic ones extended well beyond the well-known Tuskegee-in Africa projects sponsored in the 1920s and 1930s by the Phelps-Stokes Fund. From the end of the nineteenth century, in the Philippines, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, American officials advanced the cause of vocational education. American missionaries in the Middle East, Cuba, and in India also had a long tradition of establishing vocational schools. In the post–conflict setting of Serbia after World War I, vocational education held the promise of individual rescue and social development. An article on Serbia published in The Survey in 1919 noted the need for more agricultural education, called for a university extension and rural high school system, and proposed that this was an area in which “the genius of America is most likely to find a congenial sphere of remarkable usefulness.”

Through grants and equipment donated by the American Red Cross and the American Relief Administration, the SCWA assisted in the reopening of Serbian trade schools. Tools, yarn, and sewing machines were provided to over 200 trade schools and scholarships were provided for several hundred war orphans. In this work the SCWA (the “American Commission”) positioned itself as agent of broad American support for Serbia. In some cases American and Serbian institutions were paired, as was the case of the Valjevo Agricultural School, which was linked with the Boys High School of Brooklyn whose students donated all the needed funds. The Serbian letters of thanks reprinted by the SCWA register an appreciation of this assistance as American assistance, including expressions of gratitude, for example, to the “great and noble American nation.” Promotional fundraising material produced by the SCWA to appeal to Americans illustrates how American interests were tied to Serbian reconstruction. Progress, haunted by the specter of regress, framed the appeals as we see in figure 4.1. Surrounding the textual argument that “the work MUST go on,” is imagery suggesting

![Figure 4.1 Serbian Child Welfare Association Promotional Pamphlet. (Serbian Child Welfare Association, undated pamphlet [1921?], “The Work Must Go On.” By courtesy of the Department of Special Collections, Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin–Madison.](image-url)
that the advancement of the Serbian peasantry will come through educational work, namely through the "American Industrial School" of Čačak whose monumental edifice tops the image. When the SCWA published images of children at work inside the trade schools and the "domestic science schools" that were also supported, they included captions such as "the great ambition of Serbians today, from youngest to oldest, is for practical training." Such grand claims should be approached with skepticism, particularly as Zimmerman has clearly demonstrated that the American desire to spread vocational education across the globe was regularly confronted with strong local opposition and frequent preference for "academic" schooling tracks. It would certainly be a mistake to assume that these projects and messages were simply passively received in Serbia. The "American" models of agentic action, programs of child welfare, vocational education schools, and the dispositions and habits that went with them took some form in Serbia, yet this was not without resemanticization, recontextualization, and perhaps even resistance.

Conclusion: American Modernity Received?

Their ideas were too grand: Serbia was not ready for them. They came over in 1919 and 1920 with high hopes and plans for setting up a model Child Welfare Service all over the country. While they were on the Atlantic they decided where all the centres would be. They drew red and blue circles on their maps and plotted the whole thing out. They intended to have ten different centres with outposts dependent on them, clearing-houses for abandoned children, model orphanages, Infant Wellness Centres, even Vocational Guidance Clinics and Homes for the deaf and dumb—they forgot nothing. They were a disciplined, well-trained body, but when their scheme collapsed they did not know how to take up something else: they were not adaptable.... On the whole they were disappointed. The trouble was they wanted to do things too much as Americans, and the Serbs were bursting with energy and national pride and did not want anything imposed from without.

This appraisal was offered by Margaret McFie, a Scottish woman who worked on relief projects in Serbia during and after the war. Predictably, the SCWA accounts painted a rosier picture. Ralph Reeder, upon returning to Serbia in 1923 observed that a number of the SCWA projects, including the domestic science schools, the Nurses Training School the Americans had founded in Belgrade, as well as a good number of local health centers all continued under local management. When former Red Cross commissioner to Montenegro, Rushton Fairclough, returned in 1931 he found that his 1920 "comprehensive plan" for medical and educational initiatives had been partially put into effect. He found that some substitutions had been made (e.g., a hospital opened in Danilovgrad in place of Kolashin) but he generally considered all to be "operating in accordance with a well-conceived plan in which the Rockefeller Foundation played an important part." Yet, despite disagreement on whether the schemes ultimately collapsed or succeeded, the American accounts do correspond with McFie's impression that on an institutional level the Americans aimed not for stopgap assistance but for extensive restructuring.

Across Europe, American institutional restructuring aimed to systematize social welfare provision. In 1918, before the war's end, the Red Cross Magazine reported that "French soil is showing itself wholly congenial" to the introduction of a Social Service Exchange (a centralized information repository that allowed coordination among relief agencies and eliminated duplication, at the time a social work best-practice in American cities). In a study of the influence of American women who worked on reconstruction projects in the Soissons area of France, Evelyne Diebolt and Nicole Foucâde argue that the Americans had significant effects in the area of public health, notably through the creation of charitable associations and public-private partnerships. The "social survey" was also widely used in American reconstruction work, in Italy and perhaps most notably in Czechoslovakia where Masaryk's daughter, Alice Garrigue Masaryk, who had earlier spent a year and a half living at Hull House in Chicago (1904–5), made arrangements with Mary McDowell for an American trained social worker to undertake a social survey of Prague and to assist in developing the field of social work in the country. In Serbia, beyond what is recounted above in reference to the SCWA work and the mission Fairclough directed, the clearest evidence of a lasting institutional legacy following from American post-conflict reconstruction can be seen in the Yugoslav Ministry of Health, specifically in the work of the head of the Department of Hygiene and Social Medicine, Andrije Štampar, who had extremely close ties with the Rockefeller Foundation. In Austria, the postwar American Red Cross mission was purported to have accomplished "a complete renovation and reorganization of the
already established child welfare activities,” yet Austria also provides one of the few instances where American relief workers acknowledged European proficiency: in public health “the Americans had little or nothing to teach Austria in the way of organization or in methods of treatment.”

Such expressions of humility are not to be found in the American literature on Serbia and its reconstruction needs. Though the technical expertise of some Serbian doctors and officials was conceded, the SCWA lamented the lack of initiative and industriousness in their Serbian counterparts. Ralph Reeder’s internal bulletins to SCWA personnel in Serbia highlight this, as when he exhorted his employees that for Americans “there ain’t no such word as ne može [it’s not possible].” He also advised that Americans overseas should avoid “infection from the susta [tomorrow] disease, for it’s like malaria, hard to eradicate from the blood.” Action toward capacity was, of course, one of the very things that Americans sought to advance in Serbia. The school building program and the community “energy” that American aid released from its previous “paralysis” would be one area where the SCWA made the claim that they were successful in “putting across” notions of social obligation. However, despite the claims that its reconstruction program was “a program of real COMMUNITY BUILDING, the consummation of all the organized efforts of the various social, sanitary and cultural groups of the government and the country at large,” on the surface, the SCWA does not seem to have markedly rewired local cultural patterns of agentic action.

Across the 1920s and 1930s, as I have argued elsewhere, Yugoslavia tended to look toward other Slavic countries to find exemplars of modernity. Notions of “Slavic” cultural affinity and coevalness made Czechoslovakia (and Poland to a lesser extent) attractive referent societies for Yugoslav modernization projects. Of course, cultural projections of America, “American” behaviors and “American” attitudes did not vanish from the picture. Comments from a Yugoslav education professor who traveled to the Czechoslovak city of Zlín in 1933 provide one good—if slightly enigmatic—example of how “American modernity” could be recontextualized. Zlín was home to the Bata shoe company; it was a factory town with “modern” schools, social welfare provisions and civic institutions. Zagreb Professor of Pedagogy Salih Ljubunčić observed, “Zlín is a piece of America in Czechoslovakia—a pure Slavic America, not the self-estranged Anglo-Saxon America, but a real America.” Ljubunčić’s semantic recoding appropriated an authentic modernity for Central/Eastern Europe. And, while we do not know with certainty the extent to which American postwar reconstruction shaped this statement, it does suggest that the “Americanization,” which was brought to Europe through these initiatives, was reworked (hybridized and creolized) according to local circumstances.

It is not difficult to posit that such a conclusion is likely to hold for most “civilizing missions.” The chief objective of this chapter has been to establish what values, behaviors, and principles were embedded in the work of the “third American army.” In short, philanthropically-minded American relief workers attended to health and nutritional needs but also attempted to educate Europeans in self-reliance and social responsibility. In the work done on sanitation, hygiene, vocational education, and child welfare provision, domains of expertise and areas of American superiority were carved out. American reconstruction work in the aftermath of World War I had consequences for the ways that Europeans reflected on themselves, envisioned the future and attempted to realize it. At the same time, this had consequences for America’s self-image. For, having brought freedom, uplift and civilization to Europe, Americans could increasingly see themselves as legitimate in projecting norms and best-practices around the globe.

Notes

1. Serbian Child Welfare Association of America, Co-operative Reconstruction: A Report of the Work Accomplished in Serbia (New York: Serbian Child Welfare Association of America, 1924), 98. Though published without attribution, this text is most certainly the work of Ralph R. Reeder, the organization’s overseas commissioner who was based in Serbia (then part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) in the early 1920s. An earlier draft of this text dated February 21, 1921, can be found in a folder containing Reeder’s correspondence in the Edward R. Johnstone papers, box 1, (MC 538) in the Rutgers University Special Collections Library. Hereafter cited as Johnstone papers, Rutgers Special Collections.


12. All told, the Rockefeller Foundation spent more than $22 million on war-relief activities. In this same period Americans contributed $34 million to Hoover's Committee on Belgian Relief, $63 million was raised to aid Jews in Europe, and the Red Cross garnered approximately $400 million in donations. See Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 235, 44, 48; Raymond Blaine Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper, 1952), 28.


24. Akerlof on behalf of others could extend from representing the interests of those with a perceived limited agency (e.g., the "poor") to a recently disabled, as well the interests of nonactors (e.g., "the environment," spotted owl).

25. The "Americanization" of agentic action was not, of course, confined to years just after World War I as de Grazia's account of the spread of Rotary clubs throughout Europe would suggest.


29. For an analysis of this war profiteering in relation to recent conflicts see Saltman, this volume.

30. In their work on "empire," Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt are quick to argue that the United States is not at the center of the contemporary imperial project that they maintain accurately describes the globalization processes of the early twenty-first century. I am using the notion of empire differently—not to speak to a general political and social condition, but rather to think about the specific circulations of power where geographic relations, and certainly their cultural imaginations, are significant. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

32. The Kingdom of Serbia had formally existed since 1882, though certain degrees of independence from the Ottomans were achieved earlier in the nineteenth century. And, even the first Yugoslavia came into existence in December 1918 (and was officially known until 1929 as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), well into the 1920s American sources sometimes speak of “Serbia” as shorthand for the entire country. While this tendency is evident in SCWA documents, their work was principally focused on the region known as Serbia, which is the principal focus of the discussion that follows.

33. In December, 1916 editors of the Red Cross Magazine remarked that “One of the most useful—and most appreciated—works of American philanthropy in the European War has been the relief of the Serbians who retreated through Albania and found refuge on Corfu and neighboring islands in the Adriatic Sea.” Ellwood Hendrick. “‘The Serbians,’ Red Cross Magazine, no. 12 (1916): 415.


35. The American Women’s Hospitals Service was also active in the southern part of the country (now Kosovo and Macedonia), with some of their projects transferring to the Serbian Child Welfare Association in 1920. See Esther Pobi Lovejoy, Certain Servicemen, New, rev and reset. ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1933).


37. Lozanić (whose surname is frequently rendered in English-language sources as Losanitsch) later married John Prohingham a Red Cross official stationed in Serbia. In the 1920s and early 1930s the two supported orphanages in Vranje and Kameneza.


39. See the photograph appearing in “American Doctor Saved Belgrade.” Mabel Grujic (Grouch) solicited aid to Serbia while her husband was Serbian ambassador to London. She both mobilized British volunteers and also crossed the Atlantic to raise funds in the United States—initially, as early as 1912 when Serbia was embroiled in the First Balkan War. See Monica Kippener, “The Work of British Medical Women in Serbia during and after the First World War,” in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: Women Travellers in the Balkans, ed. John B. Allcock and Antonia Young (New York: Berghahn, 2000), 73; “Mme. Grouch Here for a Servant Fund,” The New York Times, October 28, 1912.


41. Jager’s mission clashed with the Red Cross work done by Dr. Edward W. Ryan, with each apparently accusing the other of impropriety. See Bicknell and Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe, 132, 73-77. In the case of the Balkans, there do not seem to have been considerable numbers of American immigrants returning to the homeland to assist in reconstruction projects. One of the most renowned instances of this involved 75 Polish-American women trained in a YWCA program in New York City and then sent to work alongside the American Relief Administration in Poland, see Robert Seymour, “An Act of Devotion: The Polish Grey Samaritans and the American Relief Effort in Poland, 1919-1921,” Polish American Studies 43, no. 1 (1986). The “Old Country Schools” operated in this period by the YWCA to train female American immigrants for social work service in their own communities do not seem to have included significant Yugoslav participation. See Nancy Gentile Ford, “The Old Country Service School: Gender, Class, and Identity and the YWCA’s Training of Immigrant Women in International Social Welfare Philosophy,” 1919,” Peace & Change 23, no. 4 (1998).

42. Lyman Bryson, “Taking the West into Monastic,” Red Cross Magazine 14, no. 7 (1919): 69.

43. Ibid., 72.

44. Bicknell and Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe, 351.

45. Faidley, Warming Both Hands, 324.

46. Bicknell and Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe, 487.

47. Homer Folks, who served as a SCWA board member, also suggested in his May 1920 book that Serbs bore a curious likeness to Americans, a perception that may have furthered the idea that Serbia was fruitful ground for American influence. “They look like Americans, talk like Americans, and seem to think like Americans,” he noted. Nonetheless, this idea has been no more than hackneyed national stereotyping, for Folks additionally appraised Serbs as “like the Japanese in their desire to learn the best quickly from other peoples; like the French in scrupulous politeness and deference; like the Italians in the warmth of their welcome and the frank expression of their sentiments; like the English in their dogged resistance; and like the Yankees in their rugged individualism.” Folks, The Human Costs of the War, 16, 97.

48. Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the politics that surrounded this textbook, however archival records connected with it are revealing in that they provide evidence of a local acknowledgment of America’s advancedness when it came to health, sanitation, and hygiene, as well as evidence of interregional tensions—such as on the question of whether the book would come out in Cyrillic or Roman script. See Archives of Yugoslavia (Belgrade), Fund 66, Box 2305, Folder 2176.


50. Traveling “motion picture” exhibits were a common public health reconstruction strategy, seen also in Serbia and Czechoslovakia. See Bicknell and Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe, 476.

51. Petrie-giving was a staple of the “better babies” health campaigns in the United States and was widely used in American reconstruction work across Europe. See, for example, “Visiting Carpathian Villages,” International Service: Bulletin of the Society of Friends’ Relief Missions in Europe, no. 4 (1920).


53. Serbian Child Welfare Association of America, Co-operative Reconstruction, 25-28. See also, Bicknell and Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe, 498.


55. Ibid., 26.


57. Serbian Child Welfare Association of America, Co-operative Reconstruction, 94.

58. This program bore remarkable similarities to the Rosenwald Fund’s (1914 through mid-1930s) projects to rehabilitate schools for blacks in the American South. Though Julius Rosenwald was active in postwar reconstruction with the American Red Cross and the Rosenwald had active in postwar reconstruction with the American Red Cross and the Joint Distribution Committee organized to aid Jews in Central/Eastern Europe, I have not been able to identify any direct links between Rosenwald and the SCWA. It is worth noting that mention of the scheme of 50/50, foundation/local matching funds was also a defining characteristic of Carnegie’s Library building program, which operated from 1883 into the 1920s. For a discussion of the Rosenwald initiative see James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 148-185.


60. See, for example, “Meeting of the Committee on Institutions and Vocational Education,” dated January 26, 1921 in Box 1, Johnstone papers, Rutgers Special Collections.


63. The late 1910s also represent one of the high points in American educators’ infatuation with vocational education on the home front, something we see in the passage of the Smith-Hughes National Vocational Education Act of 1917 and the release of the Cardinal Principles report in 1918. See the discussion in, Herbert M. Kleiber, *School to Work: Vocationalism and the American Curriculum, 1876–1946* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999).


67. SCWA projects to establish and support domestic science schools grew out of the organization’s health program and the Americans’ dismay at Serbians’ “utter ignorance of a better and more wholesome way of living.” Ibid., 72–74.

68. Ibid., facing p. 40.


72. I found fault with Merle Curti’s conclusion that “many Americans working in Serbia were...disappointed with what they accomplished.” Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 263. The evidence I have examined here suggests that while American designs weren’t perfectly realized, many successes were trumpeted with considerable self-satisfaction.


74. Known in France as the Fichier Central and in the United States also as a Charles Clearing House and Confidential Exchange “America Overseas: The Confidential Exchange in Paris,” The Survey 41, no. 5 (1916).


77. Julia Lathrop and Grace Abbott were also involved in creating a new childcare bureau in Czechoslovakia, making this a fascinating instance of women’s international political activism; that merits further study. See "Czechoslovakia Seeks to be Little America," *New York Times*, June 19, 1921; Alice Garrige Masey and Ruth Crawford Mitchell, *Alice Garrige Masey 1879–1966: Her Life as Recorded in Her Own Words and by Her Friends* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1980); Howard Wilson, Mary McDowell: Neighbor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 220.


80. On his 1918–19 study tour Homer Fokas fell ill in Belgrade and reported high satisfaction with the medical care he received. Folks, *The Human Costs of the War*, 18–19.

81. Commission Personnel Letter No. 4 [February 23, 1921], Box 1 Johnstone papers, Rutgers Special Collections.


Bibliography


